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Abstract 
Due to paucity of data, assessing whether ability drain is economically significant is difficult, though 
the fact that immigrants or their children founded over 40% of the Fortune 500 US companies strongly 
suggests that it is. Moreover, brain-drain-induced brain gain cannot occur with ability. Nonetheless, 
while brain drain has been studied extensively, ability drain has not.  
This paper examines migration’s impact on productive human capital or ‘skill’ (s) – which includes 
both ability (a) and education (h) – for source country residents and migrants, under the points system 
(PS), which accounts for education (e.g., Canada’s pre-2015 policy), ‘vetting’ system (VS), which also 
accounts for ability (e.g., US H1-B visa), and ‘new’ points system (NS), a combination of PS and VS 
(e.g., Canada, 2015 onwards).  
Findings: Migration i) results in an ability drain, that is greater than the brain drain; ii) has an 
ambiguous (positive) impact on home country residents’ (migrants’) average education and skill (S), 
with a net skill drain more likely than a net brain drain; iii) these effects increase with ability’s 
inequality or variance V(a); iv) all effects are larger under VS than under PS (i.e., larger ability, brain 
and skill drain, and thus likelier net skill drain, and greater inequality of ability, education and skill; v) 
the policies in turn raise V(a),V(h) and V(s), with V(a)> V(h); vi) based on findings for the US, 
migrants’ higher ability may account for some 20% of the migrant-to-resident income gap; (vii) 
residents’ average consumption is lower under either policy than under a closed economy; (viii) 
ability’s inequality has a negative (ambiguous) impact on average consumption under the vetting 
(points) system, (ix) contrary to the case with education and skill, consumption inequality is lower 
under VS; (x) ability and education (consumption) under NS is identical to (larger than) the average of 
their values under PS and VS. Policy implications are provided. 
Keywords 
Migration, points system, vetting system, ability drain, brain drain, and gain  
JEL Code  
F22, J24, J61, O15 
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1. Introduction 
A large number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the international migration of 
educated labor or brain drain, its determinants, its impact on human capital in migrants’ source and 
host countries, growth (Mountford 1997; Beine et al. 2001, 2008) and institutions (Docquier et al., 
2011), as well as brain gain (e.g., Mountford 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine et al. 2004, 2008; Schiff 2006; 
Docquier et al. 2011) and brain waste (e.g., Ozden 2006, Mattoo et al. 2008). Surveys of brain drain 
issues include Commander et al. (2004) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012).  
Migrants possess additional characteristics that may affect their migration and education decisions, 
an important one of which is their innate ability. The latter includes the ability to learn, communicate, 
cooperate, take risks, adapt to new circumstances, motivate people, as well as attributes such as 
ambition, creativity, intelligence, responsibility, leadership, work ethic, consideration of others’ 
viewpoints, and more. Given that returns to ability are typically higher in developed countries, average 
ability is likely to be greater among migrants than among source country residents, i.e., migrants are 
likely to be positively selected for ability (Schiff 2006).  
Given the difficulty in measuring ability, its economic significance has not been ascertained to 
date, though the fact that over 40 percent of the US Fortune 500 companies were founded either by 
immigrants or their children (Partnership for a New American Economy, 2011)
1
 suggests that the 
“ability drain” may be important. One reason an ability drain may have a greater impact and hurt a 
source country more than a brain drain is that the latter induces a brain gain while an ability drain has 
no such effect. Thus, while a brain drain may or may not deplete the average human capital stock, an 
ability drain unambiguously does. In fact, this paper finds the ability drain to be greater than the brain 
drain under both the points and the vetting systems,
2
 
3
 with a greater difference under the vetting than 
under the points system. Tables 1 and 2 in Sections 3 and 4 show the policies’ impact on education, 
ability and ‘skill’ (i.e., their sum).  
Despite the fact that ability drain and its impact may be important, I have only found three studies 
that use a direct measure of ability to examine its relationship with migration. Miguel and Hamory 
(2009) find a higher rural-urban migration rate in Kenya for individuals scoring higher on a primary 
school test. Kleven et al. (2010) show that football players in Europe respond to the host country’s tax 
rate, with a greater migration response for the more successful players. And Akgüҫ et al. (2015) look 
at one component of ability listed above, namely that related to risk, and find that it is substantially 
greater for Chinese rural-urban migrants (and family members) than for non-migrants, that substantial 
changes in the environment does not affect their attitudes towards risk, and that these are correlated 
across generations. The fact that more able individuals are more likely to migrate is incorporated in the 
model in Section 2.  
A few additional studies that do not use a direct measure of ability but infer some aspect of its 
relationship with migration are Özden (2006), Mattoo et al. (2008), and Piracha et al. (2015). The first 
two studies examine the success of highly educated migrants in the US in terms of the degree to which 
there is an education-occupation match or mismatch (with migrants overeducated for the job they 
hold). They find, among others, that the migration distance has a positive impact on their degree of 
                                                     
1
 The companies include Kraft, Procter & Gamble, ATT, Dupont, Goldman Sachs, eBay, Google, Yahoo, and many more.  
2
 The points system – e.g., Canada’s pre-2015 immigration policy – accounts for prospective migrants’ education (and 
other attributes, such as age), while the vetting system – e.g., the US H1-B visa program – also accounts for their ability. 
New points systems – e.g., in Australia, New Zealand and Canada – are combinations of the old points systems and the 
vetting system.  
3
 This paper deals with permanent economic migration, i.e., it does not examine issues related to refugees, asylum seekers, 
or return migration. 
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success. Given that the cost of the migration project rises with the distance between the US and 
migrants’ home country, the expected return on that project must increase with distance to make 
migration worthwhile, i.e., migrants’ ability must increase with distance.  
Piracha et al. (2012) similarly look at migrants’ education-occupation mismatch but they also 
include the mismatch that prevailed in the migrant’s country of origin. They find a strong relationship 
between worker-job mismatch in migrants’ country of origin and in Australia, concluding that the 
information associated with the mismatch in the country of origin constitutes an “ability signal” for 
potential employers in Australia.  
Given the potential importance of the relationship between migration and ability, the paucity of 
studies on this issue is unfortunate. Moreover, none of these studies examined the ability drain and its 
impact. This study constitutes a small step in filling this gap. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the closed economy case. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine the points and vetting systems, respectively, and compare them to each other 
and to the closed economy and non-selective case. Section 5 solves for average consumption (or 
utility) and examines the impact of the ability drain under the two policies. Section 6 examines the 
new points systems. Section 7 presents some quantitative assessment of the contribution of the ability 
drain to the average income gap between migrants and home country residents (i.e., non-migrants) and 
discusses planned empirical research. Section 8 presents some policy implications and Section 9 
concludes. 
2. Model 
 
Assume a source and a destination or host country, where productivity of source country individual 𝑖 
depends on productive human capital or ‘skill’ 𝑠𝑖 . 4 Skill is assumed to be a function of innate ability, 
𝑎𝑖 𝜖 [0, 𝑎𝑀], and education, ℎ𝑖 𝜖 [0, ℎ𝑀], with average values 𝑆, 𝐴, and 𝐻, respectively, and variance 
𝑉(𝑠𝑖), 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) and 𝑉(ℎ𝑖). Without loss of generality, ℎ𝑖 units are chosen such that ℎ𝑀 = 1, i.e., 
ℎ𝑖 𝜖 [0, 1].  
Denote the country of origin (destination) by “0” (“d”), source country natives’ income by 𝑦0𝑖 
(𝑦d𝑖) for residents (migrants), and the migration probability by 𝑝𝑖 𝜖 [0, 1]. Skill, income in both 
countries and expected income 𝑦𝑖  are:  
 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖, 𝑦0𝑖 = 𝛼0𝑠𝑖,  𝑦d𝑖 = 𝛼d𝑠𝑖, 𝛼0 𝜖 (0, 𝛼d), 
 
𝑦𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑦0𝑖  +  𝑝𝑖𝑦d𝑖 = 𝑦0𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖(𝑦d𝑖 − 𝑦0𝑖) =  [𝛼0 + (𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑝𝑖]𝑠𝑖 .  (1) 
Individuals are risk-neutral, i.e., utility, 𝑢𝑖, is a linear function of (expected) consumption, 𝑐𝑖. Assume 
for simplicity that 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖. The cost of education ℎ𝑖 is ℎ𝑖
2/2.  
Thus, consumption 𝑐𝑖, which is non-negative, is given by:  
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 −
ℎ𝑖
2
2
= [𝛼0 + (𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑝𝑖]𝑠𝑖 −
ℎ𝑖
2
2
 ≥ 0.  (2) 
 
Equation (1) assumes that incomes 𝑦0𝑖 and 𝑦d𝑖 are linear in ℎ𝑖, i.e., the marginal product of education 
is constant. Equation (2), on the other hand, assumes a quadratic education cost, i.e., the marginal cost 
of education is increasing in ℎ𝑖. Thus, investment in education exhibits diminishing returns, which is 
consistent with empirical findings.  
                                                     
4
 Note that the term “skill” used in migration studies typically refers to education and excludes ability. 
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Individuals select an education level ℎ𝑖 that maximizes 𝑐𝑖, taking the host country’s immigration 
policy and their innate ability, 𝑎𝑖, as given. For comparison purposes, assume the number of migrants, 
𝑀, or migration rate 𝑃 = 𝑀 (as population size equals 1) is identical under the two policies examined, 
i.e., 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃, where 𝑃 = ∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑀
0
, 𝑝(𝑣) denotes the points (vetting) system), and 𝑓(𝑎𝑖) is 
𝑎𝑖’s pdf. Pre-migration or gross average ability 𝐴
𝐺 = ∫ 𝑎𝑖𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑀
0
 is the source country’s average 
ability before migration and the ability drain take place. The immigration probability rises with an 
individual’s education under the points system, and with both education and ability – or skill – under 
the vetting system.
5
  
Importantly, note that the analysis provided in this paper is relevant not only for utility function 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 (with 𝑐𝑖 given in (2)) but also for any function 𝑣𝑖 that is monotonically increasing in 𝑐𝑖. In 
other words, the results hold for any 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑐𝑖),
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑐𝑖
> 0,  ∀ 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0. For instance, 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛾𝑐𝑖
𝜓
; 𝛾, 𝜓 > 0, 
𝜓 ≷ 1. A utility function could be represented by 𝑣𝑖 = log (𝑐𝑖) or 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛾𝑐𝑖
𝜓
, 𝜓 < 1. The analysis also 
holds for skill 𝑠𝑖 in (1) given by 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑖, with 𝑦0𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖
𝛼0 ,  𝑦d𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖
𝛼d. Then, the analysis can 
proceed as below, with variables 𝑥𝑖
′ ≡ log (𝑥𝑖) replacing variables 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 , ℎ𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, 𝑦0𝑖,  𝑦d𝑖.  
2.1. Closed Economy 
 
Before turning to the points and vetting systems, results are provided for the ‘closed economy’ case, 
for comparison purposes. In that case, the migration probability 𝑝𝑖 = 0. Denoting the variables in this 
case with subscript “0”, equation (2) becomes: 
 
𝑐𝑖0 = 𝑦𝑖0 −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
= 𝛼0𝑠𝑖0 −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
=  𝛼0(𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖0) −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
≥ 0.  (2a) 
Maximizing 𝑐𝑖0 with respect to ℎ𝑖0, the values for ℎ𝑖0, its average 𝐻0, average ability 𝐴0, skill 𝑠𝑖0, 
average skill 𝑆0 and its variance 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0), consumption 𝑐𝑖0 and its average 𝐶0, are: 
 
ℎ𝑖0 = 𝐻0 = 𝛼0, 𝐴0 = 𝐴
𝐺, 𝑠𝑖0 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0, 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0) = 𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆0 = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0,  
 
𝑐𝑖0 = 𝛼0 (
𝛼0
2
+ 𝑎𝑖), 𝐶0 = 𝛼0 (
𝛼0
2
+ 𝐴𝐺). (2b) 
3. Points System 
Under the points system (e.g., Canada’s pre-2015 policy), applicants receive points for education but 
not for ability. The immigration probability 𝑝𝑖𝑝 is 𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑝, to which a constant, 𝜋𝐴
𝐺 , is added to ensure 
the average immigration probability or average migration rate is identical under the points and vetting 
systems, i.e., 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃, which is assumed for comparison purposes. Note also that 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃𝑝 =
                                                     
5
 Thus, average education and skill levels are higher for migrants than for residents, i.e., migrants are positively selected 
for both. As Docquier and Marfouk (2006) show for education, the share of the highly educated in South-North migrants 
is three times that among source countries’ residents, and larger for poor, landlocked and island countries (e.g., the ratio 
for Sub-Saharan Africa is 15, and is larger for the Caribbean).  
Maurice Schiff 
4 
𝑃 implies 𝐻𝑣
𝐺 = 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐻𝐺, as can be seen by comparing equation (4) below with equation (8) in 
Section 4 (with 𝐻𝐺 defined after equation (4) below), and also implies that 𝑆𝑣
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺. 
The immigration probability is:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑝 = 𝜋(𝐴
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖𝑝), 𝜋 > 0. (3) 
Consumption in this case is 𝑐𝑖𝑝 = [𝛼0 + 𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)(𝐴
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖𝑝)](𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑝) −
ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
2
≥ 0.  
 
Defining 𝜙 ≡ 1 − 2𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0) and ≡ 
𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)
𝜙
, the solutions for ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝐻
𝐺, 𝑝𝑖𝑝, 𝑃𝑝, and 𝑠𝑖𝑝 are:  
 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑝 =
𝛼0  
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺), 𝐻𝐺 =
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝐴𝐺, 𝑠𝑖𝑝 =
𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖 
𝜙
− 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺),  
 
𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑣
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺 = 1
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺),  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑝 = 𝜋 [
𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺)] , 𝑃𝑝 =
𝜋
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) = 𝑃,  (4) 
where 𝜙 > 0 is the second-order condition and 𝐻𝐺 denotes the average ‘gross’ education level, i.e., 
the level given the incentives associated with the policy but before migration takes place. In other 
words, 𝐻𝐺 includes the brain gain generated by the points system but not the brain drain. The brain 
gain, 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 − 𝐻0, is equal to: 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0).  
Equation (12) in Section 5 shows that 𝜆 <
1
2
. With 
1
𝜙
=
𝜙 + 2𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)
𝜙
= 1 + 2𝜆, we have 
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) = 𝑉 [
𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖 
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝐴𝐺 − 𝑎𝑖)] = 𝑉 [(
 1 
𝜙
− 𝜆) 𝑎𝑖] = 𝑉[(1 + 𝜆)𝑎𝑖] = (1 + 𝜆)
2𝑉(𝑎𝑖) =
(1 + 𝜆)2𝑉(𝑠𝑖0) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0). Thus, the points system raises the variance of individual skills or skills 
inequality, relative to the closed economy case. The greater skill inequality can also be seen from the 
fact that 
𝜕𝑠𝑖0
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 1, while 
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑝
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 1 + 𝜆, as 𝑠𝑖𝑝 varies with 𝑎𝑖 and also with 𝑎𝑖’s impact on ℎ𝑖𝑝 – which is 
equal to 𝜆, so that 𝑎𝑖’s total impact on 𝑠𝑖𝑝 is 1 + 𝜆.  
The host country’s policy change from a closed economy to a points system raises the expected 
return on education, with an impact on residents’ education and skill ℎ𝑖𝑝 − ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑠𝑖𝑝 − 𝑠𝑖0 =
𝜆(𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺 + 2𝛼0) > 0. However, residents’ average skill need not increase because education 
increases with ability, which raises the migration probability. Thus, the migration rate is higher 
(lower) at higher (lower) ability and education levels, which reduces both average ability and average 
education.  
Denote the average value of a variable 𝑥𝑖 by 𝑋, and by 𝑋𝑝 ≡
1
1−𝑃
∫ 𝑥𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑝)𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑀
0
 for 
source-country residents, by 𝑋𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 
1
𝑃
∫ 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑀
0
 for migrants, by 𝑋𝑝𝑁 ≡ (1 − 𝑃)𝑋𝑝 + 𝑃𝑋𝑝
𝑀 
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for natives, and by 𝑆𝑝
𝐺  (𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝑝
𝐺) for gross (pre-migration) average skill. Solutions for 𝑋𝑝, 
𝑋𝑝
𝑀 and 𝑋𝑝𝑁 (𝑋 = 𝐴, 𝐻, 𝑆) are: 
𝐴𝑝 = 𝐴
𝐺 −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑝
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 +
𝜋𝜆
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑝𝑁 = 𝐴
𝐺 , 
𝐻𝑝 = 𝐻
𝐺 −
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑝
𝑀 = 𝐻𝐺 +
𝜋𝜆2
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑝𝑁 = 𝐻
𝐺, 
𝑆𝑝 = 𝑆
𝐺 − 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖),   𝑆𝑝
𝑀 = 𝑆𝐺 +
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑝𝑁 = 𝑆
𝐺. (5) 
As shown in (5), the brain drain is 𝜆 times the ability drain. Since <
1
2
, it follows that the ability drain 
is over twice the brain drain. The reason is that, as shown in (4), 𝑎𝑖 enters into ℎ𝑖 with coefficient 𝜆, 
and this is reflected in the equations for 𝐻𝑝 and 𝐴𝑝. Note also that the variance of 𝑎𝑖 is over four times 
that of ℎ𝑖𝑝 (see equation (4) and Table 1). 
Table 1: Points System – Ability, Brain and Skill Drain and Gain a 
 Ability  
(1) 
Education  
(2) 
Skill  
(1 + 2) 
Ratio  
(1)/(2) 
Drain (i) −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖)  −
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
1
𝜆
> 2. 
 
Gain (ii) -- 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0)    2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0)    -- 
 
Net Gain 
 (i) + (ii) 
 
−
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0) −  
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0) −
 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
-- 
Variance 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 𝜆
2 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) (1 + 𝜆
2) 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 
1
𝜆2
> 4. 
a: Results are relative to the closed economy case. 
Another result from (5) is that residents’ (migrants’) average ability, education and skill levels fall 
(rise) with inequality in the source country’s ability distribution, as measured by the variance of 𝑎𝑖. 
Thus, the host country benefits from greater 𝑎𝑖 inequality as it raises the average skill level of its 
immigrants. And, as shown above, the policy itself also raises inequality in migrants’ source country. 
Finally, the variance of 𝑎𝑖 does not affect natives’ average ability, education or skill as its impact on 
residents’ and migrants’ values cancel each other out. Table 1 presents the impact of the points system 
on the ability drain and on the brain and skill drain and gain, relative to the closed economy case.  
What is the policy’s impact on ability, education and skill, relative to a closed economy policy 
(𝜋 = 0)? Since there is no ability gain, average ability declines, with ∆𝐴𝑝 ≡ 𝐴𝑝 − 𝐴
𝐺 = 
−
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) < 0. In the no-migration case, ℎ𝑖0 = 𝐻0 = 𝛼0, so that ∆𝐻𝑝 ≡ 𝐻𝑝 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴𝐺) 
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−
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0, i.e., the impact on education is ambiguous. With 𝑆0 = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0 and 𝑆𝑝  = 𝐴
𝐺 +
𝐻𝑝
𝐺 −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), we have ∆𝑆𝑝 ≡ 𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. Thus, the policy’s 
impact on both skill and education is ambiguous.  
Since ∆𝑆𝑝 = ∆𝐻𝑝  +  ∆𝐴𝑝 = ∆𝐻𝑝 −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) < ∆𝐻𝑝, the policy’s impact on skill is more likely 
to be negative than that on education (i.e., ∆𝑆𝑝 < 0 < ∆𝐻𝑝 is a distinct possibility). Some studies (e.g., 
Beine et al. 2012) find that larger source countries tend to exhibit a net brain gain (∆𝐻𝑝 > 0), though 
the net skill impact may be positive or negative, i.e., ∆𝑆𝑝 ⋛ 0. These authors also find that a majority 
of countries exhibit a net brain drain (∆𝐻𝑝 < 0), implying a larger net skill drain (∆𝑆𝑝 < ∆𝐻𝑝). On the 
other hand, the points system raises migrants’ ability, education and skill, with ∆𝐴𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 𝐴𝑝
𝑀 − 𝐴𝐺 =
 
𝜋𝜆
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), ∆𝐻𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 𝐻𝑝
𝑀 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) +
𝜋𝜆2
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), and ∆𝑆𝑝
𝑀  ≡ 𝑆𝑝
𝑀
− 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) +
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
What about the source country’s natives as a whole (or “naturals” as referred to by Clemens et al., 
2009)? We have: 𝐻𝑝𝑁 − 𝐻0 = 𝑆𝑝𝑁 − 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴𝐺) > 0, and 𝐴𝑝𝑁 − 𝐴0 = 0. In other words, 
natives’ average education and skill levels are higher under the points system than under a closed 
economy, while the average ability is unchanged.  
Finally, consider a non-selective policy, where immigration probability for all individuals is equal 
to the points system average, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃. Then, average education (skill) for both residents and 
migrants is 𝐻𝐺  (𝑆𝐺). Thus, residents’ (migrants’) average skill level is higher (lower) under a non-
selective policy than under the points system.  
4. Vetting System 
Employers obtain the benefit of good hiring decisions and bear the burden of bad ones, and are 
therefore likely to thoroughly vet prospective employees in order to assess their productive human 
capital or skill. I refer to an immigration policy that takes both ability and education into account as a 
“vetting system,” with variables designated by subscript ‘v’. One such system is the US H1-B visa, 
where employers’ hiring decisions determine whether or not immigration takes place. Probability 𝑝𝑖𝑣 
under this policy is:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑣 = 𝜋(𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑣) = 𝜋𝑠𝑖𝑣 , 𝜋 > 0.   (6) 
In this case, 𝑐𝑖𝑣 is: 𝑐𝑖𝑣 = 𝑦𝑖𝑣 −
ℎ𝑖𝑣
2
2
= 𝛼0𝑠𝑖𝑣 + 𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑠𝑖𝑣
2 −
ℎ𝑖𝑣
2
2
≥ 0. Maximizing 𝑐𝑖𝑣 with respect to 
ℎ𝑖𝑣, the solution for ℎ𝑖𝑣, 𝑠𝑖𝑣, 𝑝𝑖𝑣 and for ℎ𝑖𝑣 − ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑝 is: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑣 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝑎𝑖 ,   𝑠𝑖𝑣 =
1
𝜙
(𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0) = 
𝑠𝑖0
𝜙
,   𝑝𝑖𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙
(𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0) = 
𝜋𝑠𝑖0
𝜙
.    
 
ℎ𝑖𝑣 − ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑝 = 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺) ⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝑎𝑖 ⋛ 𝐴
𝐺 .  (7) 
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Thus, high- (low-) ability individuals attain a higher (lower) education level under the vetting system 
than under the points system, resulting in greater education and skill inequality under the former than 
under the latter system.  
Since 
1
𝜙
= 1 + 2𝜆, we have 𝑠𝑖𝑣 = (1 + 2𝜆)𝑠𝑖𝑜 > 𝑠𝑖𝑜, and 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑜 = 2𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑜 > 0, i.e., the 
vetting system results in an increase in residents’ individual skill relative to the no-migration case. 
From (7), we have: 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣) =
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜)
𝜙2
= (1 + 2𝜆)2𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜) = 𝑉(𝑎𝑖). Since 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) =
(1 + 𝜆)2𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜), it follows that 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣) =
(1+2𝜆)2
(1+𝜆)2
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝). The fact that 𝜆 𝜖 (0,
1
2
) implies that 
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣)
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝)
 𝜖 (1,
16
9
). Moreover, 𝑉(ℎ𝑖𝑣) = 4𝜆
2 = 4𝑉(ℎ𝑖𝑝). 
Thus, inequality of residents’ skills is greater under the vetting system than under the points system or 
the closed economy policy. Solutions for 𝐻𝑣
𝐺 and 𝑃𝑣 are: 
 
𝐻𝑣
𝐺 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝐴𝐺 = 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐻𝐺 ,   𝑃𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) =
𝜋𝑆0
𝜙
= 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃. (8) 
Solutions for resident, migrant and native average ability, education and skill, are:  
 
𝐴𝑣 = 𝐴
𝐺 −
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖),   𝐴𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 + 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣𝑁 = 𝐴
𝐺;  
    
𝐻𝑣 = 𝐻
𝐺 −
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖),   𝐻𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐻𝐺 + 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣𝑁 = 𝐻
𝐺; 
 
 
𝑆𝑣 = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺 − 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖),   𝑆𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺 +
𝜋
𝜙2𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖),  𝑆𝑣𝑁 = 𝑆
𝐺,   (9) 
 
  
with  
𝜋
𝜙
+
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙
 =
𝜋
𝜙2
 (since 1 + 2𝜆 = 1 𝜙)⁄ , and 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺. 
The fact that 𝜆 <
1
2
 together with the results in (9) imply that the brain drain, 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), is smaller 
than the ability drain, 
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), with the ratio between the latter and the former equal to 1/2𝜆 > 1. 
The results are summarized in Table 2. 
Though the points and vetting systems have the same qualitative impact relative to a closed economy 
policy, with residents (migrants’) average education, ability and skill levels falling (rising) with 
inequality in the ability distribution, the vetting system’s quantitative impact is a multiple of that of the 
points system. The reason is that migration probability 𝑝𝑖𝑣, but not 𝑝𝑖𝑝, is a function of 𝑎𝑖, with the 
impact of 𝑎𝑖 on 𝑠𝑖𝑣 being twice the impact on 𝑠𝑖𝑝, and that average education depends on both 
individual education and the migration probability.  
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Table 2: Vetting System – Ability, Brain and Skill Drain and Gain 
 Ability 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Skill 
(1 + 2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) 
Drain (i) −
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖).  −
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). −
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
1
2𝜆
> 1. 
 
Gain (ii) -- 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0).    2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0).    -- 
 
Net Gain 
(i) + (ii) 
−
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0) − 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0) −
 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
-- 
Variance 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 4𝜆2𝑉(𝑎𝑖) (1 +  4𝜆
2
)𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 
1
4𝜆2
 > 1 
Ability drain (in absolute value) is 
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) under the points system, and 
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = 
𝜋(1+2𝜆)
(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) under the vetting system. With 𝜆 <  
1
2
 (see Section 5), the vetting system’s ability drain 
is over four times that under the points system. The brain drain under the vetting system is 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
=
𝜋(2𝜆+4𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) or over eight times the brain drain 
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
 under the points system. Recalling that 
𝐻𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐻𝑣
𝐺 = 𝐻𝐺and 𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑣
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺, it follows that the difference between 𝑆𝑣 and 𝑆𝑝 is equal to the 
difference in the skill drain 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) =
𝜋(1 + 4𝜆 + 4𝜆2)
(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) for 𝑆𝑣, and 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) for 𝑆𝑝, 
with the former over five times the latter.  
The same relationships hold in the case of migrants, e.g., migrants’ skill gain associated with 
ability’s heterogeneity under the vetting system is over five times that under the points system.  
We have: 
 
𝐻𝑣 = 𝐻𝑝  −  
𝜋(2𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐻𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(2𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣𝑁  =  𝐻𝑝𝑁 
 
𝐴𝑣 = 𝐴𝑝  −  
𝜋(1 + 𝜆)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(1 + 𝜆)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣𝑁  =  𝐴𝑝𝑁, 
 
𝑆𝑣 = 𝑆𝑝  − 
𝜋(1 + 3𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣
𝑀 = 𝑆𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(1 + 3𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣𝑁  =  𝑆𝑝𝑁 (10) 
 
From (10), and from 𝐻0 = 𝛼0 and 𝑆0 = 𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺 (as shown in (2b)), it follows that whether the vetting 
system results in a net education and skill gain or drain is ambiguous, though a net skill drain is more 
likely under the vetting than under the points system. Since 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃 by construction, it follows 
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that natives as a whole have the same average ability, education and skill levels under the points and 
vetting systems, though this does not hold for residents and migrants taken separately.  
The host country benefits from greater inequality in ability under both the points and the vetting 
systems as it raises migrants’ average skill level, with the benefit under the vetting system being over 
four times the benefit under the points system. Moreover, the two policies themselves raise inequality, 
and more so under the vetting system.  
Compared to the vetting system, a non-selective policy where 𝑝𝑖𝑝 = 𝑝𝑖𝑣 = 𝑃, ∀ 𝑖, results in higher 
average skill level for residents by 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
, and a lower one for migrants by 
𝜋
𝜙2𝑃
. 
5. Consumption 
This section solves for individual and average consumption under the vetting and points systems. 
Optimal individual education levels were obtained by maximizing expected consumption 𝑐𝑖𝑗 (𝑗 =
𝑝, 𝑣) in Sections 3 and 4, though realized consumption, denoted by 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑅 (𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑀) for residents 
(migrants), is lower (higher) than its expected value. Residents’ realized consumption under the points 
system, the vetting system and the closed economy, are given by 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑅 = 𝛼0𝑠𝑖𝑗 −
ℎ𝑖𝑗
2
2
, respectively, 
with ℎ𝑖0 and 𝑠𝑖0 (closed economy) given in (2b), ℎ𝑖𝑝 and 𝑠𝑖𝑝 (points system) in (4), and ℎ𝑖𝑣and 𝑠𝑖𝑣 
(vetting system) in (7).  
Residents’ realized consumption under the points and vetting systems is:  
 
𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅 = 𝛼0 (𝑎𝑖 +
𝛼0
2
) − 2𝜆2 [(𝛼0 +
𝐴𝐺
2
)
2
+
𝑎𝑖
2
4
] − [𝜆(1 − 𝛼0) + 𝜆
2(2𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺)]𝑎𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖0 = 𝛼0 (𝑎𝑖 +
𝛼0
2
), 
 
𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅 = 𝛼0 (𝑎𝑖 +
𝛼0
2
) − 2𝜆2(𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖)
2 < 𝑐𝑖0.  (11) 
     
From (11), it is clear that both 𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅 < 𝑐𝑖0 and 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅 < 𝑐𝑖0, i.e., residents are worse off under both the 
points and the vetting systems than under the closed economy, even though they are better off in an 
expected sense. The reason is that the returns on education (and ability) are identical in both cases – 
i.e., they earn 𝛼0 per unit of skill, but they overinvest in education relative to the ex-post optimum.  
From (7), we have ℎ𝑖𝑣 − ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑝 = 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺), i.e., education and skill inequality is 
higher under the vetting than under the points system. From (11), and contrary to the case with 
education and skill, individual consumption is greater (smaller) under the vetting than under the points 
system for low (high) 𝑎𝑖 values.
6
 In other words, consumption inequality is lower under the vetting 
system than under the points system.  
                                                     
6
 From (11), 
𝜕(𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅−𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅)
𝜕𝑎𝑖
< 0 and 
𝜕2(𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅−𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅)
𝜕𝑎𝑖
2 < 0, i.e., the consumption difference falls as 𝑎𝑖 increases, so that  
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Average consumption exhibits an additional loss due to the fact that 𝑝𝑖𝑝 increases with education 
under the points system (and education increases with ability), and 𝑝𝑖𝑣 increases with both education 
and ability under the vetting system. With average consumption under the closed economy 𝐶0 =
𝛼0 (𝐴
𝐺 +
𝛼0
2
), home country residents’ average consumption under the points and vetting systems is: 
 
 
𝐶𝑝𝑅 = 𝐶0 − 2𝜆
2 {(𝛼0 +
𝐴𝐺
2
)
2
+
1
4
[𝑉(𝑎𝑖) + (𝐴
𝐺)2]} − [𝜆(1 − 𝛼0) + 𝜆
2(2𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺)]𝐴𝑝 < 𝐶0,  
 
𝐶𝑣𝑅 = 𝐶0 − 2𝜆
2[𝛼0
2 + 2𝛼0𝐴𝑣 + 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) + (𝐴
𝐺)2] < 𝐶0.      (12) 
     
Thus, average consumption under either policy is lower than under a closed economy and falls with 
𝑉(𝑎𝑖)or inequality in ability.  
Residents and migrants of a given ability acquire the same level of education and thus have the 
same education cost. Hence, the difference between their individual consumption is exclusively due to 
the fact that migrants earn 𝛼𝑑 while residents earn 𝛼0 per skill unit under both policies. Thus, migrants 
earn (𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑠𝑖𝑗  more than residents, 𝑗 = 𝑝, 𝑣, and their actual consumption is greater under the new 
than under the old points system and greater under the vetting system than under the new points 
system.  
Finally, from (11), 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅 =  𝛼0 (𝑎𝑖 +
𝛼0
2
) − 2𝜆2(𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖)
2 ≥ 0, and thus:  
 
𝜆 ≤ 𝜓
1
2 <
1
2
, 𝜓 =
𝛼0(𝑎𝑖+
𝛼0
2 )
2(𝑎𝑖+𝛼0)
2.        (13)  
 
The reason for the second inequality in (12) is that 
𝜕𝜓1/2
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= −
𝛼0𝑎𝑖𝜓
−1/2
4(𝑎𝑖+𝛼0)3
< 0, so that 𝜓1/2 is at a 
maximum at 𝑎𝑖 = 0, in which case 𝜓
1/2 = 1
2
. With 𝑎𝑖  𝜖 (0, 𝑎𝑀], it follows that 𝜓
1/2 < 1
2
, and thus 
𝜆 <
1
2
. 
6. New Vetting System 
Various host countries, e.g., Australia, New Zealand and Canada, undertook a reform of their points 
system in order to attract immigrants with skills that better reflect labor market needs, i.e., they moved 
to a new points system, which entails a combination of the points and vetting systems. The reform 
raises migrants’ average ability, education and skill. On the other hand, it reduces them for home 
country residents.  
Under Canada’s new points system (denoted by “c”), up to half the maximum number of points can 
be obtained with a job offer. Thus, the new policy’s immigration probability can be modelled as an 
average of the probabilities under the points and vetting systems, i.e., 𝑝𝑖𝑐 =
1
2
(𝑝𝑖𝑝 + 𝑝𝑖𝑣) =
𝜋 (
𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺
2
+ ℎ𝑖𝑐) , ℎ𝑖𝑐 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 𝜆(1.5𝑎𝑖 + 0.5𝐴
𝐺) =
1
2
(ℎ𝑖𝑝 + ℎ𝑖𝑣) and 𝑠𝑖𝑐 =  
𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖 
𝜙
−
𝜆
2
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺) =
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1
2
(𝑠𝑖𝑝 + 𝑠𝑖𝑣). Thus, education and skill levels under Canada’s new points system are identical to the 
average of the levels under the points and vetting systems.  
Consumption 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑅 =
1
2
(𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅) +
𝜆2
8
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺)2, i.e., the consumption level under the new 
points system is larger than the average of the points and vetting systems’ levels. 7 
7. Magnitude of the Ability Drain and Research Agenda 
 
Clemens et al. (2009) compare for forty source countries i, the average income of migrants from 
country i living in the US and who acquired their education back home, with that of residents in 
country i with identical levels of education (and levels of other observable characteristics). Thus, they 
correct migrants’ income, 𝑌𝑣𝑑 = 𝛼𝑑𝑆𝑣
𝑀 = 𝛼𝑑(𝐴𝑣
𝑀 + 𝐻𝑣
𝑀), for differences in all observables, including 
education, replacing it by 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′ = 𝛼𝑑𝑆𝑣
𝑀′ = 𝛼𝑑(𝐴𝑣
𝑀 + 𝐻𝑣). They find that 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′ = 3.2𝑌𝑣0 when averaged 
over the forty source countries.
8
 Next, they correct for differences in unobservables, interpreted here as 
ability.
9
 Migrants’ average ability is 𝐴𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 + 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) while that of residents is 𝐴𝑣 = 𝐴
𝐺 −
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), with a difference 𝐴𝑣
𝑀 − 𝐴𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖).
10
  
Define 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′′ ≡ 𝛼𝑑(𝐴𝑣 + 𝐻𝑣) = 𝛼𝑑𝑆𝑣 = 𝛼𝑑 {[𝐴𝑣
𝑀 −
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖)] + 𝐻𝑣}, which is the income 
obtained in the US by someone with the source country’s average skill, i.e., with identical observables 
and unobservables. The authors obtain a ratio of 
𝑌𝑣𝑑
′′
𝑌𝑣0
=
𝛼𝑑𝑆𝑣
𝛼0𝑆𝑣
=
𝛼𝑑
𝛼0
= 2.6, which they refer to as the 
“place premium.” Hence, their result implies that 
𝜋𝛼𝑑
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′ − 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′′ = 0.6𝑌𝑣0. Thus, based 
on the results obtained in Clemens et al. (2009), the ability difference is equal to 0.6𝑌𝑣0/𝑌𝑣𝑑
′′
=
0.6/2.6, or 23 percent of the place premium.  
                                                     
7
 The reason is that the square of an average is smaller than the average of the squares, i.e., 𝑥2 <
1
2
[(𝑥 + 𝜀)2 +
(𝑥 − 𝜀)2] = 𝑥2 + 𝜀2. Since 𝑐𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼0𝑠𝑖𝑐 −
ℎ𝑖
2
2
, 𝑠𝑖𝑐 =
1
2
(𝑠𝑖𝑝 + 𝑠𝑖𝑣), and ℎ𝑖𝑐
2 <
1
2
(ℎ𝑖𝑣
2 + ℎ𝑖𝑣
2), it follows that 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑅 >
1
2
(𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅 + 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑅).  
8
 I use values obtained under the vetting system as skilled labor in the US typically enters the country under the H1-B visa 
system and are likely to be thoroughly vetted.  
9
 Borjas (1989) interprets the random variable in his earnings equation as the component associated with unobserved 
ability among individuals with the same observable skills. He also suggests it might reflect luck though, since we deal 
with country averages, individual luck would be expected to average out. 
10
 Note that 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) +
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) =
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
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6.1. Research Agenda 
New data have become available since Clemens et al.’s (2009) study, as well as new econometric 
methods, and the place premium will be re-estimated, as will the contribution of unobservables to the 
difference in source country residents’ and migrants’ income.  
Another issue that will be examined is the contribution of the difference between migrants and 
residents’ education, 𝐻𝑣
𝑀 − 𝐻𝑣, to the difference in their income, 𝑌𝑣𝑑 − 𝑌𝑣𝑑
′ = 𝛼𝑑(𝐻𝑣
𝑀 − 𝐻𝑣) =
2𝜆𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝛼𝑑𝑉(𝑎𝑖). This will enable a comparison of the contribution to the income gap between 
migrants and residents associated with the difference in their average ability with the gap associated 
with the difference in their average education level.  
Since, as was shown in Section 5, 𝜆 < 1/2, the difference in ability between migrants and 
residents, 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), is larger than the difference in education, 
2𝜆𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). Thus, one would 
expect a larger share of the income difference between migrants and residents to be explained by the 
difference in ability than by the difference in education.
11
 This will also be examined empirically.  
8. Policy implications  
Studies of the brain drain have found that a number of countries, particularly the larger ones, 
experience a net brain gain (e.g., Beine et al. 2008). As migrants are also positively selected for 
ability, and since there is no ability gain, migration results in an ability drain. Hence, countries might 
exhibit a net brain gain together with a net skill drain. The situation is obviously worse for countries 
experiencing a net brain drain – including a large share of small poor island countries – as their 
average skill level falls due to both ability and brain drain.  
As shown in equation (10) in Section 4, the vetting system, such as the US H1-B visa program, 
generates a larger ability drain and a larger net brain drain than the points system, thereby raising the 
likelihood of a net skill drain. Several immigration countries, e.g., Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, have reformed their immigration policy from the old points system to one that includes 
elements of the vetting system, thus raising the urgency of devising ways to minimize the skill drain.  
Enforcement of regulations is likely to be important. For instance, under the H1-B visa program, 
skilled immigrants can be hired for positions for which no Americans are available. However, as has 
been widely reported, a few large outsourcing firms have ‘captured’ a large share of the available 
visas, enabling some large corporations to replace US professionals with younger and cheaper 
immigrants.
12
 This practice may result in a larger skill drain from developing source countries (without 
                                                     
11
 For future use, I show here that 𝛼0 < 1. From equation (4), ℎ𝑖𝑝 =
1
𝜙
[𝛼0 + 𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)(𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺)] ≤ 1, so that 𝛼0 ≤ 
1−𝜋(2+𝑎𝑖+𝐴
𝐺)𝜶𝒅
1−𝜋(2+𝑎𝑖+𝐴
𝐺)
≡ 𝛼𝑎𝑖. Assume first that 𝛼𝑑 > 1. Then, 𝛼𝑎𝑖 < 1, and thus, 𝛼0 < 1. On the other hand, if 𝛼𝑑 ≤ 1, and 
recalling that 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝑑, we have 𝛼0 < 𝛼𝑑 ≤ 1, and thus 𝛼0 < 1. QED. 
12
 A notable example is Southern California Edison, which replaced its IT employees with younger ones brought in through 
the H-1B program, with the original employees forced to train their replacements and sign nondisclosure agreements and 
gag orders. Salaries fell from $110,000 to $70,000 a year on average (based on depositions in a Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing spurred by complaints of the practice). 
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necessarily raising host countries’ average level of human capital), and reducing it requires stricter 
enforcement of the rules of the H1-B visa program.  
Second, host countries might provide H1-B visas or other skilled immigrant visas whose extension 
or conversion to permanent status would require applicants to make some contribution to their home 
country, such as imparting their acquired knowledge to home country individuals (whether by working 
there for some period of time, regular visits, teaching via the internet or other), through some business 
relationship, or other.  
Similarly, foreign students from developing countries often receive financial support from some 
public or private agency back home (e.g., government agency, private employer, university) or in the 
host country (e.g., university, foundation). Source and host countries should cooperate to ensure that 
foreign students who obtain their degree and apply for an immigrant visa spend some time in the 
source country (which is the case for foreign students who enter the US with a J visa) or help in some 
other way.  
Finally, as was shown in Sections 5, consumption is lower for both residents and migrants than if 
they had known whether they would migrate or not – i.e., whether the realized value of 𝑝𝑖 is zero or 
one – when they decided how much to invest in education. Under perfect foresight, residents would 
have invested less in education and migrants would have invested more, and both would have been 
better off, i.e., their consumption would have been higher. One question that may be worth examining 
is whether some home or host country policy or measure(s) might help reduce this uncertainty and its 
associated cost.  
9. Conclusion  
The migration literature has examined the issue of education selectivity, including brain drain and 
brain gain, and other education-related issues, but has not done so for ability. This paper is an attempt 
to start filling this gap. 
The analysis shows that the points and vetting systems generate a net ability drain, resulting in a 
smaller net change in skill than in education. Thus, countries that exhibit a net brain gain experience a 
net skill change that is either positive but smaller than the net brain gain or is negative. A comparison 
of the two policies examined shows that residents’ (migrants’) skill drain (gain) is greater under the 
vetting than under the points system. The impact (in absolute value) of both policies on ability, 
education and skill, increases with inequality (as measured by the variance in ability), and the policies 
themselves also raise the variance of ability, education and skill, with larger effects under the vetting 
than under the points system. On the other hand, whereas education and skill inequality is greater 
under the vetting than under the points system, the opposite holds for consumption, with greater 
inequality under the points than under the vetting system.   
This paper suggests that the focus should be on skill rather than only on education, recognizing that 
productivity depends on both education and ability, which raises the likelihood of a net drain. This 
paper suggests that a further examination of the impact of migration that accounts for ability as well as 
education, particularly an empirical one, is warranted.  
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